The Legality of Staten Island\u27s Attempt to Secede from New York City by Underweiser, Jeffrey
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 19 | Number 1 Article 5
1991
The Legality of Staten Island's Attempt to Secede
from New York City
Jeffrey Underweiser
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Underweiser, The Legality of Staten Island's Attempt to Secede from New York City, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 147 (1991).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol19/iss1/5
THE LEGALITY OF STATEN ISLAND'S
ATTEMPT TO SECEDE FROM
NEW YORK CITY
I. Introduction
Nearly a century ago, in 1898, the City of New York was created in
its present form.1 The newly formed City included four counties:
New York, Kings, Queens, and Richmond (Staten Island). The
Greater New York Charter of 1901 reorganized the City government
and altered the composition of the Board of Estimate. The Board of
Estimate, the governing City body that controlled all expenditures,
had eight members, with each Borough President having one vote re-
gardless of population.' In 1981, residents of the most populous bor-
ough, Brooklyn, filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
Board's representation. The United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Board's voting scheme was unconstitutional because it violated
the principle of one person, one vote.3
The Board of Estimate was abolished as of September 1, 1990, with
the majority of its power being transferred to the City Council. Un-
like the Board of Estimate, representation on the City Council is ap-
portioned according to the City's population. As a direct result of the
transfer, Staten Island sustained a severe loss of political power within
the City. Rather than accept this new situation, Staten Island state
legislators succeeded in having Chapter 773 of the Laws of 1989 (as
amended by Chapter 17 of the Laws of 1990) passed by the State
Legislature. Chapter 773 provides a process for the borough of Staten
Island to secede from New York City, without the residents of the
rest of the City having a right to affect the process. Pursuant to Chap-
ter 773, Staten Islanders conducted a vote in November of 1990, ask-
ing residents of Staten Island if they wanted to form a commission to
create a city charter.4 As a result of an affirmative vote, Staten Island-
ers formed a commission to create a charter that will eventually be
1. Staten Island and the other four boroughs were joined to form the greater City of
New York by Chapter 488 of the Laws of New York of 1896, and Chapter 378 of the
Laws of New York of 1897.
2. Record on Appeal at 49-50, City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d
479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
3. Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
4. Staten Islanders voted overwhelmingly to continue the process for secession: 82
percent of the voters were in favor of taking the next step towards secession, while 18
percent were against it. Alessandra Stanley, Staten Island Votes a Resounding Yes on
Taking Step Towards Secession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at B7.
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presented to the residents of Staten Island for a second vote. If the
people of Staten Island ratify the secession plan, then the plan will go
before the State Legislature for final approval.5
The possible secession of a borough from the City of New York,
over the strenuous objections of the City, implicates two critical fed-
eral and state constitutional issues: the Equal Protection Clauses of
both constitutions, and the Home Rule Doctrine of the state constitu-
tion. Three New York State courts recently ruled that Chapter 773
did not violate either of these provisions.6 The two lower courts each
ruled that Chapter 773 was a valid law, and further that the State
Legislature had the power to dismember New York City at its discre-
tion. In following the concurring opinion of the appellate division,
the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds.7
The court ruled that Chapter 773 was advisory because the Legisla-
ture's permission was needed for a final approval of secession.8 There-
fore, the court of appeals declined to comment on whether the
Legislature could validly allow Staten Islanders to secede over the ob-
jections of the City.
This Note argues that according to judicial interpretations of the
state and federal constitutions, Staten Island should be allowed to se-
cede from New York City regardless of the City's position. Part II of
this Note analyzes the background history leading up to this case.
The section examines the formation of the City, Staten Island's rea-
sons for seceding, the positions of the City and State, and the state
courts' decisions concerning Chapter 773.
Part III analyzes the issue of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I Section
11 of the New York State Constitution. Federal case law on the sub-
ject does not refer to any secession cases, but instead points to similar
annexation and voting rights cases. All of these cases favor a very
strong presumption of constitutionality regarding the state laws, and
support the validity of Chapter 773 or any similar law.
Part IV discusses the more delicate Home Rule Doctrine of the
New York State Constitution. While the concept of Home Rule has
existed in the state constitution for almost 100 years, it has almost
never invalidated a state law due to a lack of consent by the localities.
5. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17).
6. City of New York v. State of New York, 146 Misc. 2d 488, 556 N.Y.S.2d 823; 158
A.D.2d 169, 557 N.Y.S.2d 914; 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154
(1990).
7. City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561
N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
8. Id. at 484, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
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Regardless of the numerous changes in the constitution, supposedly
increasing the strength of Home Rule, the state courts have consist-
ently interpreted the doctrine very narrowly. These rulings lead to
the conclusion that the doctrine would not stand in the way of Staten
Island's secession. Yet, if the State Legislature can divide a city at its
discretion, then it seems that the doctrine of Home Rule no longer
exists.
Part V concludes that based upon federal and state case law, Staten
Island can legally secede from New York City as long as the State
Legislature supports the secession. It would take a clear deviation of
case law on either the state or federal level to prevent the secession.
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the Equal Protection Clause
strongly suggest that the clause would pose no barrier to secession.
Rulings by the courts of New York State also support a similar result
concerning the Home Rule issue. Such a decision, though, would lead
to the unwanted result of a state court's de facto nullification of an
article to the state constitution.9
II. Background
A. The Creation of New York City
"'The sun will rise this morning upon the greatest experiment in
municipal government that the world has ever known-the enlarged
city.' "1o On January 1, 1898, after a noisy and exuberant New Year's
Eve celebration, the greater New York that we know today was
formed.1 The consolidation, though, had taken eight years of plan-
ning. The movement for a greater New York began in 1890, when the
State Legislature passed, and Governor David B. Hill signed, an act
which created a commission to investigate the feasibility of consoli-
dating the municipalities located in or. near the harbor of New York.I2
Based upon the commission's support of unification, the Legislature
in 1894 passed a bill which allowed the citizens of all the affected
areas to vote in an advisory referendum on the issue of consolida-
tion. a All four counties, New York (which then included the Bronx),
9. The overall risk to New York City is even greater than the possible loss of Staten
Island. Civic leaders in Queens, the City's second most populous borough, are also con-
sidering secession from New York City. Joe Queen, Civic Leaders Mull Boro Secession
Bid, NEWSDAY, Oct. 13, 1991, at 2 (Queens ed.).
10. John A. Krout, Framing the Charter, in THE GREATER CITY NEW YORK, 1898-
1948, 41 (Allan Nevins and John A. Krout eds., 1948) (quoting NEW YORK TRIBUNE,
Jan. 1, 1898).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 47.
13. Id. at 48. The referendum included language informing the voters that "Your
1991]
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Kings (Brooklyn), Queens and Richmond (Staten Island), voted for
consolidation. Specifically, Staten Islanders voted overwhelmingly for
unification by a vote of 5,531 to 1,505.11 At the request of recently
elected Governor Levi P. Morton, a new commission was formed by
the State Legislature in 1896 to continue the work of the first commis-
sion. After a number of hearings, the new commission recommended
the creation of a charter commission and set January 1, 1898 as the
date for the establishment of a greater New York.15 The new com-
mission's recommendations were accepted by the Legislature in the
form of the Lexow Bill, and the Legislature went on to create and
pass a new charter for the new city in 1897.16 Whatever imperfections
the original charter had were partially corrected in 1901 by the
Greater New York Charter. Among other things, the 1901 Charter
altered the composition of the Board of Estimate by giving each Bor-
ough equal representation regardless of population. 17 The greater
City of New York had been formed.
B. Staten Island and Secession
Today, however, Staten Island is in the process of trying to secede
from New York City. In the last 90 years, Staten Islanders have accu-
mulated a long list of grievances stemming from their borough's rela-
tionship with the City of New York.18 This general discontent
recently blossomed into a movement for secession after the United
States Supreme Court decision in Board of Estimate of City of New
York v. Morris.19 In Morris, residents of Brooklyn, the City's most
populous borough, challenged the legality of the Board of Estimate.
Even though the boroughs had widely disparate populations, each
had equal representation on the Board of Estimate.2 ° The Court ruled
that the Board provided Staten Island with voting power in excess of
its population, in contravention of the "one person, one vote" princi-
vote is only a simple expression of opinion. Actual consolidation does not come until the
Legislature acts." 1898 N.Y. Laws 64.
14. THE BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE ALMANAC, 1898, at 135.
15. Krout, supra note 10, at 50-53.
16. Id. at 56-58. 1896 N.Y. Laws 488 created the commission; 1897 N.Y. Laws 378
created the charter. Both the Lexow Bill and the charter were submitted by the Legisla-
ture to the Mayors of New York and Brooklyn for approval based upon the Home Rule
Article of 1894. Id. at 56-58. See JERROLD SEYMANN, COLONIAL CHARTERS PATENTS
AND GRANTS TO THE COMMUNITIES COMPRISING THE CITY OF NEW YORK 613 (1939).
17. 1901 N.Y. Laws 446, § 226; Krout, supra note 10, at 60.
18. Memorandum of Governor Mario M. Cuomo approving Senate Bill Number
2655-A, Approval Memo No. 68 (Dec. 15, 1989).
19. 489 U.S. 688 (1989); see Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 6-7.
20. 489 U.S. at 690.
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ple.2 1 As a result, the Board of Estimate was abolished as of Septem-
ber 1, 1990, with the majority of its power being transferred to the
City Council in which representation is apportioned by population.22
Because Staten Island makes up only 5.2% of the City's population,
its relative political power has been significantly lessened by the Mor-
ris decision.2" Thus, perceiving that they had been denied a meaning-
ful role in the governance of the City, many Staten Island residents
and public officials have called for secession from New York City.
Motivated by Staten Islanders' call for secession, the State Legisla-
ture passed Chapter 773 of the Laws of 1989 by a wide margin.24
Chapter 773 is a law which provides a mechanism for Staten Island to
secede from the City. The process as described by Chapter 773 began
on election day in November of 1990.25 In a referendum, only Staten
Islanders were asked if they wanted to form a charter commission
which would plan secession and draw up a charter for the new City of
Staten Island.26 The commission which is now being formed can only
be comprised of Staten Island residents. 27 The commission must cre-
ate a charter and submit it to the Governor and State Legislature
within 30 months of November, 1990.28 In the six months following
the submission, public hearings will be held in Staten Island to con-
sider the charter, concluding in a vote by only Staten Island residents
on whether to approve the charter.29 Finally, if Staten Islanders vote
in the affirmative, then the charter will go to the State Legislature for
final approval.3 0 Thus under Chapter 773, Staten Island cannot se-
cede from New York City without final approval by the State.3'
21. Id.; see Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 6-7.
22. City of New York v. State of New York, 146 Misc. 2d at 490, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
825; see Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 50.
23. See Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 123.
24. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17). Chapter 773 passed the
Senate by a vote of 58 to 1, and the Assembly by a vote of 117 to 21. Senate bill S2655-A
(and Assembly bill A3539-C). Chapter 17 passed the Senate by a vote of 51 to 6, and the
Assembly by a vote of 94 to 38. Senate bill S6868 (and Assembly bill A9289). Memoran-
dum by Governor Mario Cuomo approving Senate Bill Number 2655-A, Approval
Memo No. 68 (Dec. 15, 1989).
25. Mireya Navarro, Staten Island Turns to Cost of Parting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1990, at B12.
26. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17); See supra note 4.
27. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17), § 4(a).
28. Id. at § 4(c).
29. Id.
30. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17), § 4.
31. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17).
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C. The Positions of the City and State of New York
The City of New York opposes secession on the grounds of equal
protection under the law and the need of a Home Rule message.32
The City first argues that the non-Staten Island residents of New
York City had their right to equal protection under the law violated
by Chapter 773. Chapter 773, according to the City, allows one
group of New Yorkers to exercise the-franchise over key matters that
affect other New Yorkers, without the other New Yorkers having the
right to vote on the matter.33 In cases where the State grants the
franchise to some residents and denies it to other affected residents,
the City argues that the State must show that the division serves a
compelling state interest.34 The City concludes that no compelling
state interest has been presented by the State, and that none exists
which would make the law legal.35
The City also argues that Chapter 773 is void because it was en-
acted without a Home Rule message from the Mayor of New York
City and the City Council. The City states that Article IX of the New
York State Constitution, the Home Rule Amendment to the constitu-
tion, only allows the State to affect the property, affairs or government
of a locality through a general law, or, through a special law with the
request of two-thirds of the local legislature or by request of the local
chief executive officer and a majority of the local legislature.36 The
City contends that Chapter 773, and any future law that would allow
Staten Island to secede, affects the property, affairs or government of
the City, is a special law, is not a matter of state concern, and thus
requires a Home Rule message from the City to make the law valid.37
The State of New York counters by arguing that Chapter 773 is a
valid law. The State claims that the law does not offend the state and
federal governments' Equal Protection Clauses. Chapter 773, accord-
ing to the State, is only advisory because no secession can occur with-
out the approval of the State Legislature. 38 Even if the law were not
32. Brief for the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York before the New York
State Court of Appeals at 20, 41, City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 479,
562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
33. Id. at 41.
34. Id. at 45-51.
35. Id. at 54-61.
36. Id. at 20; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2, 3. A general law is a law which effects all
areas of the State equally, while a special law is one which applies to one or more, but not
all localities in the State. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
37. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 32, at 20-23, 30.
38. Brief for the Attorney General of the State of New York before the New York
State Court of Appeals at 31, City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 479,
562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
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advisory, and allowed Staten Island to secede without additional State
approval, it would not violate the Equal Protection Clauses because a
State can restrict participation in an election to residents most affected
by the law. In such cases, the law must only be rationally related to
the State's objectives.39 Under either interpretation of Chapter 773,
the State concludes that the law does not violate New Yorkers' right
to equal protection under the law.
The State also argues that Chapter 773, or any future law allowing
secession from the City, does not require a Home Rule message from
the City of New York. Matters of state concern, according to the
State, are never subject to Home Rule constraints regardless of the
effect on localities.' The State claims that since the Home Rule Arti-
cle to the constitution specifically grants the State the power to create
local governments, the power is automatically one of state concern
and thus exempt from a Home Rule message.41 The State continues
by stating that even if Article IX does not explicitly make this matter
one of state concern, a state interest is created in resolving a conflict
between a county and the rest of the City of New York. 2 The State
thus reasons that Chapter 773, and any future law allowing Staten
Island's separation from New York City, is and would be a valid exer-
cise of the State's power.
D. The City of New York Sues the State of New York, Claiming
that Chapter 773 Violates the State and Federal
Constitutions
The City of New York challenged the validity of Chapter 773 by
bringing suit against the State in New York State Supreme Court in
New York County. In a decision written by Justice Herman Cahn,
the court found that Chapter 773 was valid, and that the State Legis-
lature had the power to separate Staten Island regardless of the posi-
tion of the City of New York.4 3 The court explained that Chapter 773
did not violate the Equal Protection Clauses because it required the
final approval of the State Legislature and thus was merely advisory
in nature." Yet the court continued by declaring that even if Chapter
773 were not advisory, the State had the power to allow Staten Island
39. Id. at 34-36.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 18-19 (referring to Article IX, § 2(a) of the New York State Constitution).
42. Id. at 27.
43. City of New York v. State of New York, 146 Misc. 2d 488, 556 N.Y.S.2d 823
(1990).
44. Id. at 494, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
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to secede.45 The trial court also found that Chapter 773 did not vio-
late the Home Rule Article of the New York State Constitution. The
court explained that the doctrine has been construed narrowly, so that
the State has the power to create and destroy municipal corpora-
tions.46 Furthermore, if the matter is one of state concern, then the
State can ignore the Home Rule Amendment.47 Since the boundaries
of a city are of significant state concern, and Chapter 773 embodies
the plenary power of the State, Justice Cahn concluded that Chapter
773 does not require a Home Rule message to be a valid state law, nor
would any final state action creating the City of Staten Island.4"
The Appellate Division, First Department, of the State Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court by also finding Chapter
773 to be a valid state law, and that the State could allow Staten Is-
land to secede without the City's approval.4 9 The appellate division,
agreeing with the trial court, stated that the law was definitely not
advisory, and that Chapter 773 and any future decisions by the State
were ripe for a judicial decision. In the majority opinion, written by
Justice Wallach, the appellate division ruled that Chapter 773 did not
violate the state or federal constitutions' Equal Protection Clauses. 1
The court based the decision on a number of considerations: Staten
Islanders were affected disproportionately compared to other resi-
dents of New York City, the distinction between the groups was very
precise, and the geographical classification was acceptable.5 2 The ap-
pellate division also concluded that Chapter 773 and any subsequent
decision by the State to allow Staten Island to secede would not vio-
late the Home Rule Article. Justice Wallach contended that laws af-
fecting municipal boundaries simply do not fall under the Home Rule
provisions of the state constitution. 3 The State's power to create lo-
cal governments is plenary, "beyond Home Rule constraints," and a
"matter of state concern by definition" despite any local interests. 4
Justice Milonas, writing separately for himself and Justice Asch,
concurred in the majority's decision. Justice Milonas agreed that
45. Id. at 495, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
46. Id. at 492-93, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27.
47. Id. at 494, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
48. Id., 556 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28.
49. City of New York v. State of New York, 158 A.D.2d 169, 557 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1990).
50. Id. at 172, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16.
51. Id. at 173-75, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
52. Id. at 174, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
53. Id. at 173, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
54. Id., 557 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
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Chapter 773 did not violate either the state or federal constitutions. 55
Yet because the final decision would ultimately be made by the Legis-
lature, Justice Milonas stated that Chapter 773 was non-binding and
advisory, and as a result did not compel secession. 6 Justice Milonas
therefore concluded that "it is premature for this court to decide
whether the State Legislature may constitutionally bypass obtaining
the consent of the City" if it later chooses to allow Staten Island to
secede.5 7
The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
appellate division by ruling that Chapter 773 was a valid law, but
declined to rule on a possible future final decision by the Legislature
to separate Staten Island from New York City without the City's ap-
proval.5  In a per curiam opinion, the court of appeals agreed with
the concurrers in the appellate division by stating that while Chapter
773 was ripe for review, it was merely advisory because it required an
act by the Legislature to make the results of Chapter 773 binding. 9
The court held that Chapter 773 did not violate either Equal Protec-
tion Clause. According to the court, the State could recognize the
distinctive interest of a political subdivision through a reasonable clas-
sification of distinct rights.' The court found that allowing Staten
Islanders to express their views, without giving them the right to uni-
laterally come to a binding result, was clearly a reasonable classifica-
tion, and unoffensive to the Equal Protection Clauses.6
The court of appeals also decided that Chapter 773 did not violate
the Home Rule Article, but again did not rule on any possible future
legislation. The court failed to find any State interference in the
Home Rule Article because of its conclusion that Chapter 773 is advi-
sory in nature. 62 Because of the "wholly speculative" nature of Chap-
ter 773, and the fact that it does not initiate secession nor represent
any loss of power by the Legislature with respect to secession, the
court stated that the Home Rule provision of the constitution did not
even apply. 63 The court concluded that Chapter 773 was a valid State
55. Id. at 175, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18.
56. Id. at 176, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
57. Id., 557 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
58. City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561
N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
59. Id. at 484-86, 562 N.E.2d at 120-21, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57.
60. Id. at 486-87, 562 N.E.2d at 120-21, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
61. Id. at 487, 562 N.E.2d at 121, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
62. Id. at 485-86, 562 N.E.2d at 120-21, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57.
63. Id. at 486, 562 N.E.2d at 120-21, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156-57.
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law, but declined to make a ruling on whether a final law separating
Staten Island from New York City would be legal.
The dissent, however, stated that Chapter 773 violated the Home
Rule Article. Judge Hancock, writing for himself and Judge Alexan-
der, argued that a Home Rule message is mandated because the mat-
ter is one of local concern." Nothing could concern a city more than
its boundaries and its governmental structure.65 The dissent contin-
ued by contending that the charter commission is not advisory; in-
stead it would be created to direct the process towards secession.66
They stated that the actions of a commission investigating secession
would lead to feelings of uncertainty and confusion felt by everyone,
conscription of resources and personnel by Staten Island at State ex-
pense, and costs to New York City to "create and fund a parallel
process" to prepare and react "to any Staten Island secession bill em-
anating from the Chapter 773 process. ' 67 Thus, the dissent stated
that the distinct local concerns and the costs and confusion that
would result from the law made Chapter 773 not advisory, and there-
fore subject to a Home Rule message. The dissent concluded since
"[t]here was no such message, . . .the legislation, therefore, is
invalid." 68
III. Chapter 773 And Any Future Secession Legislation Do Not
Violate The Equal Protection Clauses
A. The Equal Protection Clauses
Both the United States and New York State Constitutions include
Equal Protection Clauses. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'69 Article I, Section 11 of the New York State
Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. ' 70 In inter-
preting the two clauses, the New York State Court of Appeals has
repeatedly held that "the State constitutional equal protection clause
"171[sic].. .is no broader in coverage than the Federal provision....
64. Id. at 488-91, 562 N.E.2d at 122-24, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 158-60.
65. Id. at 488, 562 N.E.2d at 122, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
66. Id. at 488-89, 562 N.E.2d at 122-23, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
67. Id. at 489-91, 562 N.E.2d at 122-24, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60.
68. Id., 562 N.E.2d at 122-24, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 158-60.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
70. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
71. 'See alsoUnder 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 360 n.6, 482 N.E.2d 1, 7
n.6, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522, 528 n.6 (1985)Golden v. Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618, 624, 564 N.E.2d
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Specifically, in "election matters we have... observed that'the State
guarantee of equal protection 'is as broad in its coverage as that of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' "72 When deciding whether a law violates
the State Equal Protection Clause, the court of appeals analyzes fed-
eral decisions that interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.73 Holdings
by the United States Supreme Court strongly suggest that New York
State has the power to pass a law allowing only Staten Islanders to
vote for secession without violating either Equal Protection Clause.74
B. Federal Decisions Defining the Law
The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that under spe-
cific circumstances, a state has the power to deny the franchise to
some residents when it offers a referendum.75 Specifically, the Court
has described how to approach a special interest election, or a "single-
shot" referendum, where the franchise is limited to a certain group of
voters.76 For the referendum to be constitutionally permissible, the
issue must have a "disproportionate impact on an identifiable group
of voters."77 If this type of impact is found, the state can limit the
franchise to the voters most affected if the special election concerns
governmental bodies of limited jurisdiction.78 The "classifications
must be tailored so that the exclusion of . .[one class of voters]... is
necessary to achieve the articulated state goal." 79
611, 614, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1990); Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 313-14, 437 N.E.2d
1090, 1094, 452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (1982).
72. Esler, 56 N.Y.2d at 314, 437 N.E.2d at 1094, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 337 (quoting Sea-
man v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 102, 209 N.E.2d 778, 782, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, 450
(1965)).
73. Golden, 76 N.Y.2d at 624, 564 N.E.2d at 614, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 4; Esler, 56
N.Y.2d at 313-14, 437 N.E.2d at 1094, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Therefore, for the purposes
of this Note, the two Equal Protection Clauses will be treated as safeguarding the same
rights.
74. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
75. The Fourteenth Amendment sets a relatively low standard of review for state laws
that affect one group of citizens differently than others. "State Legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power," and the law "will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
76. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
77. Town of Lockport, 430 U.S. at 266. Accord, Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978); Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 728.
78. Town of Lockport, 430 U.S. at 266. In Salyer Land Co., for example, the Supreme
Court held that the electorate of a water storage district could be apportioned to give
greater influence to those groups most affected by the vote. 410 U.S. at 731-35.
79. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); see Mc-
Gowan, 366 U.S. at 425-26. This concept originated in the case of Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
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The validity of a classification of voters into interested and nonin-
terested groups also depends upon whether the classification is reason-
ably precise, and if the "group interests were sufficiently different to
justify total or partial withholding of the electoral franchise from one
of them."8 Therefore, if the voters in the two groups have "substan-
tially identical interests" regarding the substance of the referendum,
then the classification would be unconstitutional.8 The type of classi-
fication also affects the kind of standard used in analyzing the law. In
an election, "any classification restricting the franchise on grounds
other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless
the.. .State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling
State interest."82 Thus, classifications that burden fundamental rights
or that are used against minorities are subject to a test of strict scru-
tiny.83 Franchise restrictions based on residence or geographical loca-
tion are instead held to a mere rationality test.84
207 U.S. 161 (1907). In Hunter, the Supreme Court stated that the powers a state gives
to a municipal corporation is granted at the absolute discretion of the state:
The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers,
may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other
agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it
with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All
this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent
of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the State is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution,
may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States.
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79. While Hunter is still good law, Kramer, and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, have slightly limited the absolute statements in Hunter. See
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627-32; Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 71 (discussing how Kramer has
qualified Hunter). The Supreme Court has since stated that Hunter does not preclude
judicial consideration of a claim that a change in municipal boundaries resulted in a
violation of voting rights and the Constitution. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960). Yet, all equal protection decisions made since Hunter have to be analyzed by
recognizing the sweeping powers a state starts with in this area. Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S.
at 71.
In a very similar case decided shortly after Hunter, the New York State Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the State law which created the County of the Bronx from land that had
been part of New York County was a valid law. People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207
N.Y. 533, 101 N.E. 442 (1913). The State law stated that only residents of the proposed
county could vote on the issue of separation from New York County, and that the separa-
tion would automatically become effective upon the approval of the referendum by the
Bronx voters. 1912 N.Y. Laws 548. The court ruled that no equal protection rights were
violated by the law. Unger, 207 N.Y. at 543-44, 101 N.E. at 445-46. Yet just like
Hunter, this case is subject to recent Supreme Court decisions.
80. Town of Lockport, 430 U.S. at 266-67.
81. Id. at 268.
82. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975); see Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 68-69.
83. Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 474-75 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
84. Id. at 474; St. Louis County, Mo. v. City of Town and Country, 590 F. Supp. 731,
STATEN ISLAND SECESSION
C. Applying the Equal Protection Clauses to Chapter 773 and
Any Future Secession Legislation
Based upon decisions by the United States Supreme Court, Chapter
773 and any future state law allowing the secession of Staten Island
without the consent of New York City do not offend the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses. 5 In the special interest elections proposed by Chap-
ter 773, there is no doubt that the secession of Staten Island would
have a disproportionate impact on residents of Staten Island as com-
pared to residents of the rest of the City. The State's goal, as articu-
lated by Chapter 773, is to allow Staten Islanders, and not the rest of
the City, to decide if they want to continue as a component of New
York City. 6 By having only Staten Islanders participate in the pro-
cess, up until final legislative approval, the State accomplishes that
goal. The distinction between Staten Island residents and the resi-
dents of the other four boroughs is reasonable and precise, and the
two groups clearly have different interests.8 7 Since this type of classi-
fication is one of residence or geography, the law is held to a rational-
ity test. Chapter 773 and any law allowing one group of people to
choose secession through a series of referenda and a long deliberate
process are both reasonable and rational. The State's desire to gauge
the level of political discontent of approximately 400,000 of its resi-
dents is rationally related to any final vote by the State Legislature on
the issue. Therefore, Chapter 773, as well as any other future state
law which would allow the secession of Staten Island through a refer-
endum limited only to Staten Island voters, does not and would not
736-37 (E.D. Miss. 1984); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397, 1403
(D. Colo.), aff'd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
85. Of course if one concludes that Chapter 773 is merely advisory, then there is even
less of a possibility that the law violates equal protection rights. For the purposes of this
Note, the issue will be addressed as whether the State has the power to have such a
special election in a nonadvisory capacity.
86. 1989 N.Y. Laws 773 (amended 1990 N.Y. Laws 17).
87. The City of New York opposes secession, because it fears losing a tax paying
population of almost 400,000 people, approximately 20% of the City's total land area,
and billions of dollars worth of property that the City has built, improved and maintained
at the City's expense. See Brief for the City of New York, supra note 32, at 10-11. Staten
Island supports secession on the grounds that it has lost a great deal of political power in
the City and now wants to control itself after years of grievances with City dominion. See
supra notes 18, 23.
In Lockport, the Supreme Court addressed a New York law which required two sepa-
rate groups to vote for the creation of a county before the county could be created. In
upholding the law, the Court stated that "the question of the constitutionality of Art. IX
of the New York Constitution... turns, not on the perceptions of voters in a particular
county, but on whether the State might legitimately view their interests as sufficiently
different to justify a distinction between city and town voters." Town of Lockport, 430
U.S. at 270 n.17.
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violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and New
York State Constitutions..8
IV. According To Judicial Interpretations Of The Home Rule
Doctrine, The State Government Can Separate Staten
Island From New York City Without City
Approval
"Under the current scheme of things, the term 'constitutional home
rule' is a misnomer. In most states, a more accurate designation
would be 'judicial home rule.' "89 State courts have had to reconcile
the "difficult problem of furthering strong local governments but leav-
ing the State just as strong to meet the problems that transcend local
boundaries, interests and motivations." 90 New York State courts
have interpreted the Home Rule Amendment to the state constitution
as being completely subservient to the State's interests. 91 One com-
mentator has even described Home Rule as being nothing more than a
"ghost."' 92 Yet at no point has Home Rule been so fundamentally
tested as with the actual tearing apart of a city by the State. One
would assume that the Home Rule Article to the state constitution
would be able to protect the very integrity of a city. However, if the
judicial history of Home Rule is any guide, the New York State Court
of Appeals will allow Staten Island to secede from New York City,
and simultaneously finally destroy Home Rule.
A. A History of the Home Rule Doctrine
In 1894, a Home Rule provision was first added to the New York
State Constitution.93 However, New York courts have historically
been loathe to enforce the Home Rule message mandate. From 1894
88. In regard to their inability to vote in a referendum, the citizens of the rest of New
York City are qualified voters in the State, "and so remain equal participants in the elec-
tion of the state legislators who created and have the power to change" the law. Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 n.20 (1981).
89. W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 311, 314 n.10 (1954) (quoting R. MoTr, HOME RULE FOR AMERICAN CITIES 51
(1949)).
90. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 498, 362 N.E.2d
581, 587, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 955 (1977).
91. See, e.g., id. at 490, 362 N.E.2d at 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 949; Adler v. Deegan, 251
N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
92. James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York" "The Ghost of Home
Rule", 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1985).
93. The Home Rule provision stated that any special law - a law which affects only
a small number of localities - that also "relat[es] to the property, affairs or government
of cities," requires the Legislature to request a Home Rule message from the mayor of the
locality affected. If the mayor refused to accept the bill, then the Legislature would then
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to 1923, the New York State Court of Appeals consistently upheld
laws which never obtained Home Rule messages from localities.94 In
Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, a case that presents the tone
found in the rest of the decisions of this period, the State's Rapid
Transit Act only applied to cities with populations over one million
people.9" In rejecting a Home Rule challenge, the court stated that
the law is a general one, and therefore not subject to Home Rule be-
cause it could affect all cities in the State.96 While Home Rule ap-
peared in the constitution of 1894, it was "viewed by the courts... [as]
merely a pleasant myth." 97
Although in 1923 the Home Rule Article was amended to
strengthen the principle of Home Rule,98 the New York State Court
of Appeals chose to ignore the significance of this amendment. The
amendment no longer allowed a mayor to temporarily suspend a law.
Instead, all special laws that affected the "property, affairs or govern-
ment" of a locality became illegal unless the Governor declared that
an emergency existed and the Assembly and Senate passed the law by
a two-thirds majority. 99 After 1923, one of the first cases to challenge
a state law on Home Rule grounds actually resulted in the striking
down of the statute. In the Matter of the Mayor of New York [Elm
Street], the court unanimously struck down a law that was written
with so much detail, that there was no way that the law could have
referred to any other area but New York City.t ° Chief Judge Car-
have to pass the bill a second time to make it law. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894)
(amended 1923, 1938, repealed 1963).
94. For example, in People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, the court of appeals stated that
consent by the cities in this case was not needed because of the "liberal spirit" the court
could use in interpreting Home Rule. 149 N.Y. 367, 381, 44 N.E. 146, 150 (1896).
95. Only New York City had such a population. Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New
York, 206 N.Y. 110, 138-39, 99 N.E. 241, 249 (1912).
96. Id. at 139-40, 99 N.E. at 249-50. The following year, in People ex rel. Unger v.
Kennedy, the court allowed the Bronx to'be separated from New York County without a
Home Rule message from New York City. See supra note 79.
The court in Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of
New York determined that an amendment to the Rapid Transit Act was not a special law
even though it applied only to cities of over one million people. Again the decision rested
on the fiction that cities of one million inhabitants is legally distinguishable from specifi-
cally naming one or two cities. 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922).
97. Richland, supra note 89, at 326; See J. D. Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-
1965: Retrospect and Prospect, 15 BuFF L. REV. 335, 342 (1965).
98. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2, 4 (1923) (amended 1938, repealed 1963).
99. Id. "The Home Rule Amendment.. .of 1923.. .was intended to vest in the cities
of the State increased control of their own property, affairs and government." City of
New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 435, 165 N.E. 836, 837 (1929).
100. 246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24 (1927); See 1925 N.Y. Laws 602, §§ 1-2 (the law at
issue in this case).
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dozo, writing for the court, stated that:
Home Rule for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and
after many years of agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a
form of words and little else, if the courts in applying the new tests
shall ignore the new spirit that dictated their adoption. The mu-
nicipality is to be protected in its autonomy against the inroads of
evasion.o
In this decision, Cardozo appeared to recognize the significance of
Home Rule and the public's desire to see its vigorous implementation.
However, while the sweeping language of the court suggested that
Home Rule would become an active part of State law, the court soon
illustrated that Matter of Elm Street was a deviation and not the
norm. 
02
In City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, the New York State
Court of Appeals once again took a more narrow approach to the
Home Rule Article.10 3 The case involved a State law which changed
part of New York City's boundary lines with neighboring communi-
ties without a declaration of an emergency by the Governor.1°4 In
another unanimous decision, the court upheld the law by arguing that
"[iun the absence of express restrictions placed by the [c]onstitution
upon the exercise of its legislative powers, the Legislature may create
or destroy, enlarge or restrict, combine or divide, municipal corpora-
tions."1 5 Although the court stated that it can "hardly be doubted"
that any law which determines a locality's boundaries is a special law
that "affects its property, affairs or government," the court also stated
that "[legislation relating to the boundaries of political divisions of
the State is a matter of state concern, and its benefits extend beyond
the limits of the property, affairs and government of the city which is
affected." 10 6 The court concluded that because the law's effect on the
City "[was] so slight as to be almost illusory," the state's concern or
interest outweighed the effect on the City.0 7 As a result, the court
101. Matter of Elm Street, 246 N.Y. at 76, 158 N.E. at 25-26.
102. At the same time that Matter of Elm Street was decided, the appellate division
took a different position. In Adriaansen v. Board of Education, the appellate division
stated that "[t]he authority of the Legislature over the boundaries of subdivisions of the
State is absolute. It may consolidate, add to or take from the territory of a municipality
or district, without the consent of the municipality or district affected." 222 A.D. 320,
323-24, 226 N.Y.S. 145, 147 (1927), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 542, 162 N.E. 517 (1928).
103. 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929).
104. 1928 N.Y. Laws 802, §§ 1-4.
105. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. at 437, 165 N.E. at 838.
106. Id. at 439-40, 165 N.E. at 838-39.
107. Id. at 445-47, 165 N.E. at 841-42. The court, though, did maintain the possibility
of local interests superseding State concerns:
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upheld the constitutionality of the law, and once again weakened
Home Rule.
Whatever glimmer of hope for Home Rule that may have existed
after Village of Lawrence was snuffed out by the State's highest court
that same year. In Adler v. Deegan, the New York State Court of
Appeals upheld the Multiple Dwelling Law, which only applied to
cities with populations of at least 800,000.108 The law was specifically
directed against unsanitary and hazardous slum dwellings. 109 Ac-
cording to the court, the words:
"property, affairs or government of cities" have become words of
art, and were so used in the recent Home Rule Amendment, now
known as article [sic.] XII of the Constitution .... The fact remains
that this court gave to these words. . .a special limited mean-
ing .... When the people put these words in article [sic.] XII of the
Constitution, they put them there with a Court of Appeals' defini-
tion, not that of Webster's Dictionary." 0
The court stated that "if the subject be in a substantial degree a mat-
ter of [s]tate concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled
with it are concerns of the locality.''I Thus, if the matter was one of
state concern, then it automatically did not fall within the "property
affairs or government" of a city. 12 The court concluded that the law
at issue was a matter of state concern, did not need a Home Rule
message, and thus did not violate the state constitution." 13
After Adler, the New York State Court of Appeals used the idea of
state concern to uphold a variety of laws. In one case, New York
Steam Corp. v. City of New York, the State passed a law which ignored
Article XII and allowed all cities with a population over one million
to pass local tax laws. "' The court held that since the law was
designed to combat high unemployment during an unstable time pe-
We recognize that, conceivably, in some cases the effect of a change of the
boundaries of a city upon its property, affairs or government might be very
serious. Disconnection of territory might render the existing form of govern-
ment of a city inappropriate to meet the needs of its altered boundaries. It
might place outside of the altered boundaries property of the city of substantial
value. We do not now pass upon such a situation.
Id. at 445, 165 N.E. at 841.
108. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929); 1929 N.Y. Laws 713. Once again, the only
city the law could apply to was New York City.
109. 1929 N.Y. Laws 713.
110. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 473, 167 N.E. at 707.
111. Id. at 491, 167 N.E. at 714.
112. Id. at 474-78; 167 N.E. at 707-09.
113. Id. at 477-78, 167 N.E. at 708-09.
114. 268 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172 (1935).
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riod, the matter was one of state concern." 5 The decisions of the
court of appeals after 1923 reflected a very narrow interpretation of
Home Rule.
In 1938, although the Home Rule Article was amended again, the
New York State Court of Appeals continued to interpret it nar-
rowly.' 1 6 Rather than require a gubernatorial emergency message to
obtain a special law, the new provision mandated a local request."'
Yet the 1938 Convention that met to alter Home Rule, desired that
the new Home Rule Article, and the concept of "property, affairs and
government," be interpreted in the same narrow way by the courts.I 8
Therefore, the period from 1938 to 1963 resulted in the continued
deterioration of Home Rule in New York."19
The Home Rule provision of the state constitution was last altered
in 1963. 10 The 1963 Home Rule Amendment to the constitution was
"intended to expand and secure the powers enjoyed by local govern-
ments."'' The 1963 Home Rule "package" also included the Munic-
ipal Home Rule Law and the Statute of Local Governments. The
texts of both statutes mandate that they be "liberally construed."' 2
Thus, the amendment appeared to give an affirmative grant of power
to local governments to manage their own affairs, while restricting the
State Legislature from intruding on local matters. The new Home
Rule law, however, once again stated that the legislature could pass
any law which did not affect the "property, affairs or government" of
a local government.2 3 The retention of that key phrase led legal
scholars of the time period to predict that "[i]t is unlikely that the
115. Id. at 143, 197 N.E. at 173. In County Securities, Inc. v. Seacord, the court con-
firmed the supremacy of the State over the City in regard to taxation. 278 N.Y. 34, 15
N.E.2d 179 (1938).
116. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (1938) (repealed 1963).
117. Id.
118. W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York" II, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 598, 605 (1955).
119. See, Connolly v. Stand, 192 Misc. 872, 83 N.Y.S.2d 445, aff'd without opinion,
274 A.D. 877, 82 N.Y.S.2d 922, aff'd without opinion, 298 N.Y. 658, 82 N.E.2d 399
(1948); Ainslee v. Lounsberry, 275 A.D. 729, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857, appeal denied, 275 A.D.
865, 89 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1949). See also, Hyman, supra note 97, at 335; Richland, supra
note 118, at 610-12.
120. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-3.
121. Wambat Realty Corp., 41 N.Y.2d at 496, 362 N.E.2d at 585-86, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
953-54. Section 1, for example, is entitled the "Bill of Rights for Local Governments."
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
122. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. STAT. LOCAL
Gov'Ts LAW § 20 (McKinney 1963).
123. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3. The constitution expressly provides that the Legisla-
ture retains plenary power over "matters other than the property, affairs or government"
of municipalities. Id.
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new amendment will have the effect of changing a single significant
court decision dealing with home rule." '124 Subsequent state court rul-
ings proved this prediction to be accurate.
Wambat Realty Co. v. State of New York, the most important post-
1963 New York State Court of Appeals case concerning Home Rule,
completely reaffirmed the Adler line of cases, and maintained a very
narrow interpretation of Home Rule.125 After stating that the 1963
Home Rule Amendment was intended to increase power to local gov-
ernments, the court then concentrated on the Legislature's retention
of the language "property, affairs or government" in the new arti-
cle. 126 The court believed that the intentional use of these words once
again meant that its previous decisions concerning Home Rule were
still relevant.127 Referring to Adler, the court stated that if a substan-
tial degree of state concern exists, then the State will not be paralyzed
from acting if the matter also touches upon the "property, affairs, or
government" of a locality. 2 " In fact, "[ilt mattered not that in each
of these cases there was encroachment upon local concerns; the vital
distinction was that the subject matter in need of legislative attention
was of sufficient importance to the State, transcendent of local or pa-
rochial interests or concerns. '" 29 Thus, even though the 1963 Home
Rule Amendment was intended to increase power to the localities, the
court of appeals chose once again to take a very restricted view of
Home Rule.
Later that same year, the high court of New York in Board of Edu-
cation v. City of New York confirmed that if a significant degree of
state concern existed, then the State could act unfettered by Home
Rule.13 1 In Board of Education, the State passed a law ordering the
City of New York to appropriate a specific percentage of its budget to
education.' 3 ' The court first stated that Article IX, § 3, expressly ex-
empted Home Rule restrictions from laws dealing with education. 132
124. Hyman, supra note 97, at 335-36 (quoting Grad, The New York Home Rule
Amendment-A Bill of Rights for Local Governments?, 14 Loc. Gov'T L. SERVICE LET-
TER 9 (1964)) (also quoting Lazarus, Constitutional Amendment and Home Rule in New
York State, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1964, at 1, 4).
125. 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977).
126. Id. at 493-97, 362 N.E.2d at 583-86, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 951-54.
127. Id. at 496-97, 362 N.E.2d at 585-86, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 953-54.
128. Id. at 494, 362 N.E.2d at 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
129. Id., 362 N.E.2d at 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 952. The court stated that "neither
[c]onstitution nor statute was designed to disable the State from responding to problems
of significant State concern." Id. at 497, 362 N.E.2d at 586, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
130. 41 N.Y.2d 535, 362 N.E.2d 948, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1977).
131. 1976 N.Y. Laws 132.
132. Board of Education, 41 N.Y.2d at 542, 362 N.E.2d at 954, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
Article IX specifically states that nothing in the Article "shall restrict... the legislature in
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Even if education was not expressly exempted from Home Rule, the
court concluded that "legislation dealing with matters of State con-
cern even though of localized application and having a direct effect on
the most basic of local interests does not violate the constitutional
home rule provisions." 133
The more recent case of Kelley v. McGee elaborated on the power of
the State.' 34 In Kelley, the court held that a state law which required
that certain full-time District Attorneys be paid at the same salary
levels as County Court Judges in those same counties, did not violate
Article IX of the state constitution. 3 5 The court once again stated
the consistent theme that "in areas of State-wide significance, the
State may freely legislate, notwithstanding the fact that the concern of
the State may also touch upon local matters."'136 Even though the
court acknowledged that Article IX specifically grants power to local
governments to control the salaries of its officers, the court argued
that the State could pass any law controlling these salaries as long as
the law is a general one.137 According to the court, once a minimum
state interest is found, a classification among local governments is ac-
ceptable as long as the classification is "reasonable and related to the
State's purpose.' 3  The court concluded that since "[c]lassifications
based upon the population of members of the class have long been
held reasonable," that the law at issue was constitutional. 39 As a
relation to. . . [t]he maintenance, support or administration of the public school sys-
tem .. " N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
133. Board of Education, 41 N.Y.2d at 542, 362 N.E.2d at 954, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
The court in Hotel Dorset v. Trust for Cultural Resources, addressed a law which only
benefitted cultural institutions of over 50,000 square feet in property and with an average
of at least an annual admission of 500,000 people. 46 N.Y.2d 358, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 413
N.Y.S.2d 357 (1978). While acknowledging that the law could only apply to the Mu-
seum of Modem Art, the court maintained its old position that the law is not a special
law because it could apply to more than one entity in the future. Id. at 368-69, 385
N.E.2d at 1288-89, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62. The court also stated that even if the law
were a special one, it would be constitutional because a state concern always exists when
the law acts to preserve an entity of importance to the State. Id. at 373, 385 N.E.2d at
1291, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 364-65.
134. 57 N.Y.2d 522, 443 N.E.2d 908, 457 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1982).
135. Id. at 530, 443 N.E.2d at 909, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
136. Id. at 538, 443 N.E.2d at 913-14, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40.
137. Id. at 539 n.14, 443 N.E.2d at 914 n.14, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 440 n.14.
138. Id. at 540, 443 N.E.2d at 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 441. In the case of Matter of Town
of Islip v. Cuomo, the court of appeals addressed a State law designed to protect the
drinking water of part of the State. 64 N.Y.2d 50, 473 N.E.2d 756, 484 N.Y.S.2d 528
(1984). After reciting the law, as has been consistently interpreted by the court for de-
cades, the court ruled that the law was general, of state concern, and that it did not
violate the Home Rule provision. Id. at 52-58, 473 N.E.2d at 757-61, 484 N.Y.S.2d at
529-33.
139. Kelley, 57 N.Y.2d at 540, 443 N.E.2d at 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 441. The court of
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result, the court of appeals has taken a consistently strict view of
Home Rule since its inception, regardless of changes in the
constitution.
B. A Summary of the New York State Court of Appeals' Present
View of Home Rule
The current interpretation of Home Rule, which for all intents and
purposes has been the same one since Adler, can be analyzed as a
series of rules. General laws are unaffected by the Home Rule Arti-
cle, while special laws are subject to the doctrine. A special law that
directly affects the property, affairs or government of a locality is un-
constitutional unless the matter is one of a substantial or significant
degree of state concern. Even if the law affects basic local interests, it
is constitutional as long as state concern is also present.
C. The Home Rule Article of the Constitution Will Not Prevent
the Secession of Staten Island
Based upon the past decisions of the New York State Court of Ap-
peals, the State Legislature can allow Staten Island to secede without
a Home Rule message from New York City. First of all, the City has
to overcome a very high standard in order to prove that a state law is
unconstitutional. "Legislative enactments carry an exceedingly
strong presumption of constitutionality, and while this presumption is
rebuttable, one undertaking that task carries a heavy burden of dem-
onstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. . .. "I"
Any final act that would allow Staten Island, via Chapter 773, to se-
cede from New York City would be a special law because the law
would only affect one area: New York City. The special law would
affect the property, affairs or government of New York City.'41 The
appeals as recently as 1989 reaffirmed its position on Home Rule in Kamhi v. Town of
Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989). After once again
stating that the Home Rule Article should be interpreted "liberally," the court then pro-
ceeded to state the traditional line that a local law is invalid if it is "inconsistent with the
[clonstitution or any general law." Id. at 428-29, 547 N.E.2d at 348-49, 548 N.Y.S.2d at
146-47.
140. Elmwood-Utica Houses v. Buffalo Sewer Authority, 65 N.Y.2d 489, 495, 482
N.E.2d 549, 551-52, 492 N.Y.S.2d 931, 933-34 (1985); Hotel Dorset, 46 N.Y.2d at 370,
385 N.E.2d at 1289-90, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 362-63; People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 505,
227 N.E.2d 829, 834, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9, 16 (1967); Town of Monroe v. Carey, 96 Misc. 2d
238, 242, 412 N.Y.S.2d 939, 941-42 (1977).
141. The loss of Staten Island would have a dramatic affect on New York City. To
begin with, the secession of Staten Island would result in the removal of almost 400,000
people from the City, and a reduction of 19.5 percent of the City's total land area. In
addition, the City of New York owns properties in Staten Island worth billions of dollars.
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State, though, also considers this an important State issue.'42 Issues
concerning the boundaries of a political subdivision-are matters of
state concern, and state action may be needed in some cases. When
almost 400,000 residents of the State are so angered by their local
government that they wish to secede from it, the State is the most
reasonable political force available to maintain a degree of stability.
Therefore, based upon the court of appeals' view of Home Rule, the
State Legislature may remove Staten Island from New York City
without a Home Rule message from the City.
The one lingering problem concerns the future of Home Rule. Al-
most since its inception, Home Rule has been interpreted by state
courts as a shadow in the constitution. Instead of preserving local
authority, Home Rule has created "a presumption of state con-
cern."' 43 Yet the possible secession of Staten Island could very well
toll the final death knell of Home Rule. At no time has the very exist-
ence of Home Rule been so fundamentally tested. What could affect
the property, affairs or government of a city more than the dismem-
bering of that city? State courts, however, have not hesitated in ignor-
ing the Home Rule mandate in the constitution and the express will of
the State Legislature. If the planned secession of Staten Island does
not violate the Home Rule provision, then nothing will. The state
courts must invoke the doctrine of Home Rule to prevent the seces-
sion of Staten Island and the destruction of Home Rule.
V. Conclusion
According to federal and state case law, Chapter 773 and a future
law allowing Staten Island to secede from the City of New York with-
out participation by the entire City is or would be constitutional. The
equal protection rulings, and the idea that localities only exist at the
whim of the State are clear and understandable. What does not ap-
Brief for the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, supra note 32, at 10-11.
"There are more than 50 schools, more than 25 parks, 18 firehouses, approximately a
dozen libraries, cultural facilities. . police precincts, a hospital, a ferry terminal, over
1,000 miles of paved streets, almost 900 miles of water pipes, over 650 miles of sewers,
33,475 street lights, and a variety of other buildings and properties" all located in Staten
Island and owned by the City of New York. Id. at 11. The City has also spent millions
of dollars on equipment for the police and fire departments and the schools. Id. at 12. In
addition, the City disposes almost all of the refuse it collects each day in the Fresh Kills
Landfill located in Staten Island. Id. at 11. Finally, the loss of Staten Island would lead
to a reduction in income to New York City from sales and taxes, and greatly inhibit the
City's ability to raise money and pay off debts. Id. at 12-13.
142. Governor Cuomo and both houses of the State Legislature overwhelmingly sup-
ported Chapter 773. See supra note 24.
143. Cole, supra note 92, at 715.
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pear cognizable is the purpose of the Home Rule Article of the New
York State Constitution. If the state courts, regardless of legislative
intent or amendments to the constitution, will interpret the doctrine
as an apparition, then why should it exist at all? As Chief Judge Car-
dozo feared, the Home Rule Doctrine has become a form of words
and little else. The secession of Staten Island is Home Rule's last
stand. If Home Rule fails to survive the attempted secession of Staten
Island, then it is truly a dead article of the New York State
Constitution.
Jeffrey Underweiser

